When and How Do Presidents Terminate Sanctions? The Effect of Domestic Factors on US Sanctions Policy

Abstract

When does the U.S. Congress move to impose sanctions on foreign countries? While prior research highlights Congress’s influence on sanctions policy, little is known about what drives legislators to act. This paper investigates factors driving the introduction and approval of sanctions legislation, arguing that the factors shaping sanctions policymaking vary across the different stages of the legislative process. Using a dataset of U.S. sanctions legislation from 1987 to 2014, we run a series of logistic regressions to analyze this two-staged process. While prior work emphasizes the role of domestic interests in driving legislative behavior on sanctions, we find that legislators are also responsive to international conditions. Our analysis shows that legislators are more likely to propose sanctions against countries violating international norms or threatening global security, but less likely to approve them when those countries are major recipients of U.S. exports.