

300.746: Seminar on Economic Statecraft
Winter Semester 2023/24
Monday, 15:15-16:45, SE U10 (RU42UG1.U10)

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Office Hours: Wednesday, 10:00-12:00 (by appointment)

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Course Description

Economic statecraft is the use of economic tools, i.e. financial and regulatory, to achieve foreign policy objectives. For a long time, the primary focus in International Relations was on the threat or use of force, with tools for economic statecraft being seen as mere symbolic gestures or tools of little consequence. Nevertheless, in the last three decades, there has been a remarkable surge in the utilization and significance of tools for economic statecraft. A recent example is the use of economic sanctions to respond to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This course familiarizes students with the different tools available in the economic statecraft toolkit, including trade, foreign direct investment, and sanctions. We will study how and when governments select from their economic statecraft toolkit—which frequently involves selecting between economic rewards and punishment. Additionally, we will study the conditions under which these tools work best, while emphasizing the conceptual and methodological issues involved in measuring their effectiveness.

Course Objective

By the end of this course students will:

- Be familiar with the different tools for economic statecraft and understand theories related to when they are used, how they work, and if they are effective.
- Gain a better understanding of the complexities and trade-offs of using economic coercion and the politics of rewards and punishment.
- Apply theoretical approaches to analyze (current) real-world events.
- Get an introduction to empirically studying economic statecraft, such as available data bases and sources.
- Learn to engage in group discussions, as well as provide and receive constructive criticism.

Course Requirements

1. Attendance (10% of the grade): You can miss 1 class without excuse. If you miss 2 classes, then your attendance grade will be deducted by half; 3 misses means that you do not receive any attendance grade (0 points). If you miss more than 3, you will fail this class. To be excused, students need to email the instructor the reason(s) and a copy of a legitimate document before the beginning of the respective class. You are expected to attend and actively participate in class discussions. To be able to do so, you will have to read the required readings in advance of each session. All required readings have been uploaded on Blackboard. You are expected to be able to summarize the main points of each required reading in your own words and to argue for your own opinion. You are expected to bring a digital or paper copy of the required readings to class. You are strongly encouraged to offer suggestions and email material to me to circulate in class.
2. Group Presentation (15% of the grade): You will be randomly assigned to a group (2 – 3 students) that presents a case study related to one of the formulated questions guiding each session. The presentation should be based on two journal articles discussing the case study (suggestions can be found in the syllabus). The presentation should also tie the case study to the required readings of the respective session.
3. (Critical) Article Review (25% of the grade): You will review a published research article that is assigned in the syllabus. The review should be 1000 to 1500 words long. The review should provide a compact summary of the article, evaluate the research methods used, and assess the strengths and weaknesses of the theory and presented empirical evidence. It should provide some pushback and counterarguments to the reviewed journal article. The review is due **November 27**. It should be sent to me electronically as a PDF file via email.
4. Research paper (45%): formulate a research question and briefly discuss the state of the art on that question. Then derive one (or more) testable hypotheses and employ empirical evidence (quantitative, qualitative, or mixed) to test these hypotheses.

You will submit a two-page formal proposal (5% of the grade) by **January 22**. The formal proposal should include your research question, a compact view of the literature, hypotheses, and an annotated bibliography. The final research paper should be around 6000 words (excluding the bibliography) and is due by **February 28**. Both documents should be sent to me as a PDF file via email.

Important Dates

27 November 2023 (Critical) Article Review

22 January 2024	Formal Proposal
28 February 2024	Research Paper

Other Information

- Expectations: Handle all your coursework diligently. Invest time to actively participate in class, pay attention to the written assignments, group presentations, and your interactions with fellow students. Ensure that all assignments are submitted on time. Please be respectful to each other. Any disrespectful, disruptive or hateful comments may result in an academic penalty. All cell phones are to be turned off or silenced during class.
- Accommodation: Reasonable accommodations are available for students with a documented disability. Please let me know if you have a documented disability, so I can provide the accommodations you may need.
- Late submissions: Please note that late submissions will be penalized by subtracting one third of a grade for each day of delay. This includes weekends and holidays. I only make an exception to this if you have a medical certificate.
- Plagiarism: Please note that all work you submit to the university for assessment must be your own work. Plagiarism will result in a “nicht genügend” on your course work and possibly in formal disciplinary procedures.
- Course schedule: The schedule and readings are subject to change. All changes will be announced by email and updated on Blackboard in advance. It is your responsibility to keep up with the current changes. Reading assignments are given by date and should be completed prior to the respective class.

Course Plan

Session 1 (2 October 2023): Introduction

Session 2 (9 October 2023): Background and Foundations of Economic Leverage

What is economic statecraft? Can interdependence between states serve as the engine of economic statecraft? How effective is economic statecraft as a policy instrument?

Required readings

- Blackwill, R. D., & Harris, J. M. (2016). The lost art of economic statecraft: Restoring an American tradition. *Foreign Affairs*, 95(2), 99-110.
- Farrell, H., & Newman, A. L. (2019). Weaponized interdependence: How global economic networks shape state coercion. *International Security*, 44(1), 42-79.

Further readings

- Baldwin, D. A. (2020). What is economic statecraft? In *Economic statecraft: New Edition* (pp. 28 – 51). New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
- *Blanchard, J. M. F., Mansfield, E. D., & Ripsman, N. M. (1999). The political economy of national security: Economic statecraft, interdependence, and international conflict. *Security Studies*, 9(1-2), 1-14.
- Collins, S. D. (2009). Can America finance freedom? Assessing US democracy promotion via economic statecraft. *Foreign Policy Analysis*, 5(4), 367-389.
- Wright, T. (2013). Sifting through interdependence. *The Washington Quarterly*, 36(4), 7-23.

Potential case study

China:

- Cha, V., & Lim, A. (2019). Flagrant foul: China's predatory liberalism and the NBA. *The Washington Quarterly*, 42(4), 23-42.
- O'Connell, W. D. (2022). Silencing the crowd: China, the NBA, and leveraging market size to export censorship. *Review of International Political Economy*, 29(4), 1112-1134.

Block I: Economic Rewards

Foreign Aid

Session 3 (16 October 2023): Unilateral Foreign Aid Donors

Why do unilateral states disburse foreign aid? Is foreign aid selfless? Should aid allocation be determined by recipient merit and/or by donor self-interest?

Required readings

- Alesina, A., & Dollar, D. (2000). Who gives foreign aid to whom and why? *Journal of Economic Growth*, 5, 33-63.
- Hoeffler, A., & Outram, V. (2011). Need, merit, or self-interest—what determines the allocation of aid? *Review of Development Economics*, 15(2), 237-250.

Further readings

- Bommer, C., Dreher, A., & Perez-Alvarez, M. (2022). Home bias in humanitarian aid: The role of regional favoritism in the allocation of international disaster relief. *Journal of Public Economics*, 208, 104604.
- Dreher, A., Nunnenkamp, P., & Thiele, R. (2011). Are 'new' donors different? Comparing the allocation of bilateral aid between non-DAC and DAC donor countries. *World Development*, 39(11), 1950-1968.
- *Heinrich, T. (2013). When is foreign aid selfish, when is it selfless? *The Journal of Politics*, 75(2), 422-435.

Data

- EU Foreign Aid (https://euaidexplorer.ec.europa.eu/index_en)
- US Foreign Aid (<https://www.foreignassistance.gov/>)

Potential case study

China:

- Dreher, A., & Fuchs, A. (2015). Rogue aid? An empirical analysis of China's aid allocation. *Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue Canadienne d'Économique*, 48(3), 988-1023.
- Naim, M. (2007) "Rogue aid," *Foreign Policy* 159 (March/April), 95–96.

India:

- Fuchs, A., & Vadlamannati, K. C. (2013). The needy donor: An empirical analysis of India's aid motives. *World Development*, 44, 110-128.
- Manning, R. (2006). Will 'emerging donors' change the face of international co-operation? *Development Policy Review*, 24(4), 371-385.

Session 4 (23 October 2023): Multilateral Foreign Aid Donors

How and why do international institutions disburse aid? How are multilateral aid decisions made and what factors influence the decision-making process?

Required readings

- Dreher, A., Sturm, J. E., & Vreeland, J. R. (2009). Development aid and international politics: Does membership on the UN Security Council influence World Bank decisions? *Journal of Development Economics*, 88(1), 1-18.
- Stone, R. W. (2004). The political economy of IMF lending in Africa. *American Political Science Review*, 98(4), 577-591.

Further readings

- Dreher, A., Sturm, J. E., & Vreeland, J. R. (2009). Global horse trading: IMF loans for votes in the United Nations Security Council. *European Economic Review*, 53(7), 742-757.
- *Oatley, T., & Yackee, J. (2004). American interests and IMF lending. *International Politics*, 41, 415-429.

Data

- World Bank (<https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/DT.ODA.ALLD.CD>)
- IMF (<https://data.imf.org/?sk=388dfa60-1d26-4ade-b505-a05a558d9a42>)

Session 5 (30 October 2023): The Effectiveness of Foreign Aid

Is foreign aid effective for achieving foreign policy goals? How can the provision of foreign aid induce policy changes by the recipient state?

Required readings

- Bapat, N. A. (2011). Transnational terrorism, US military aid, and the incentive to misrepresent. *Journal of Peace Research*, 48(3), 303-318.
- Bearce, D. H., & Tirone, D. C. (2010). Foreign aid effectiveness and the strategic goals of donor governments. *The Journal of Politics*, 72(3), 837-851.

Further readings

- Carnegie, A., & Marinov, N. (2017). Foreign aid, human rights, and democracy promotion: Evidence from a natural experiment. *American Journal of Political Science*, 61(3), 671-683.
- Dreher, A., Fuchs, A., Parks, B., Strange, A., & Tierney, M. J. (2021). Aid, China, and growth: Evidence from a new global development finance dataset. *American Economic Journal: Economic Policy*, 13(2), 135-174.
- Knack, S. (2004). Does foreign aid promote democracy? *International Studies Quarterly*, 48(1), 251-266.
- *Wright, J. (2008). To invest or insure? How authoritarian time horizons impact foreign aid effectiveness. *Comparative Political Studies*, 41(7), 971-1000.

Trade

Session 6 (6 November 2023): Political Motivations for Trade

What considerations influence the establishment of trade agreements? Can trade be used for foreign policy goals? Are trade partners similar (culturally, economically, or ideologically)?

Required readings

- Fordham, B. O., & Kleinberg, K. B. (2011). International trade and US relations with China. *Foreign Policy Analysis*, 7(3), 217-236.
- Spilker, G., Bernauer, T., & Umaña, V. (2016). Selecting partner countries for preferential trade agreements: Experimental evidence from Costa Rica, Nicaragua, and Vietnam. *International Studies Quarterly*, 60(4), 706-718.

Further readings

- *Chilton, A. S. (2016). The political motivations of the United States' bilateral investment treaty program. *Review of International Political Economy*, 23(4), 614-642.

Data

- US trade agreements (<https://www.trade.gov/all-trade-agreements>)
- EU trade agreements (https://policy.trade.ec.europa.eu/eu-trade-relationships-country-and-region/negotiations-and-agreements_en)

Session 7 (13 November 2023): The Effectiveness of Trade

Is trade effective for achieving foreign policy goals? Does trade influence the prospect of peace?

Required readings

- Gartzke, E. (2007). The capitalist peace. *American Journal of Political Science*, 51(1), 166-191.
- McDonald, P. J. (2004). Peace through trade or free trade? *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 48(4), 547-572.

Further readings

- Chen, F. R. (2021). Extended dependence: Trade, alliances, and peace. *The Journal of Politics*, 83(1), 246-259.
- *Kleinberg, K. B., & Fordham, B. O. (2013). The domestic politics of trade and conflict. *International Studies Quarterly*, 57(3), 605-619.
- Milner, H. V., & Kubota, K. (2005). Why the move to free trade? Democracy and trade policy in the developing countries. *International organization*, 59(1), 107-143.

Potential case study

China:

- Flores-Macías, G. A., & Kreps, S. E. (2013). The foreign policy consequences of trade: China's commercial relations with Africa and Latin America, 1992–2006. *The Journal of Politics*, 75(2), 357-371.
- Kastner, S. L. (2016). Buying influence? Assessing the political effects of China's international trade. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 60(6), 980-1007.

Foreign Direct Investment

Session 8 (20 November 2023): Regime Type and FDI

Who attracts FDI and why is it important? What are the political consequences of FDI?

Required readings

- Bak, D., & Moon, C. (2016). Foreign direct investment and authoritarian stability. *Comparative Political Studies*, 49(14), 1998-2037.
- Jensen, N. M. (2003). Democratic governance and multinational corporations: Political regimes and inflows of foreign direct investment. *International Organization*, 57(3), 587-616.

Further readings

- Blanton, R. G., & Blanton, S. L. (2012). Labor rights and foreign direct investment: Is there a race to the bottom? *International Interactions*, 38(3), 267-294.

- Li, Q., Owen, E., & Mitchell, A. (2018). Why do democracies attract more or less foreign direct investment? A metaregression analysis. *International Studies Quarterly*, 62(3), 494-504.
- *Li, Q., & Resnick, A. (2003). Reversal of fortunes: Democratic institutions and foreign direct investment inflows to developing countries. *International Organization*, 57(1), 175-211.
- Resnick, A. L. (2001). Investors, turbulence, and transition: Democratic transition and foreign direct investment in nineteen developing countries. *International Interactions*, 27(4), 381-398.

Session 9 (27 November 2023): FDI and Economic Statecraft

What makes FDI a potential tool for economic statecraft? How can FDI be used to achieve foreign policy goals?

Required readings

- Barry, C. M., & Kleinberg, K. B. (2015). Profiting from sanctions: Economic coercion and US foreign direct investment in third-party states. *International Organization*, 69(4), 881-912.
- Tingley, D., Xu, C., Chilton, A., & Milner, H. V. (2015). The political economy of inward FDI: opposition to Chinese mergers and acquisitions. *The Chinese Journal of International Politics*, 8(1), 27-57.

Further readings

- Chilton, A. S., Milner, H. V., & Tingley, D. (2015). *Public opposition to foreign acquisitions of domestic companies: Evidence from the United States and China*. The Political Economy of International Organization.
- *Kim, D. H. (2013). Coercive assets? Foreign direct investment and the use of economic sanctions. *International Interactions*, 39(1), 99-117.
- Lim, D. J., Ferguson, V. A., & Bishop, R. (2020). Chinese outbound tourism as an instrument of economic statecraft. *Journal of Contemporary China*, 29(126), 916-933.

Potential case study

China:

- Dreher, A., Fuchs, A., Parks, B., Strange, A. M., & Tierney, M. J. (2018). Apples and dragon fruits: The determinants of aid and other forms of state financing from China to Africa. *International Studies Quarterly*, 62(1), 182-194.
- Dollar, D. (2017). China's investment in Latin America. *Geoeconomics and Global Issues*, 4(3), 23-31.

Block II: Economic punishment

Economic sanctions

Session 10 (4 December 2023): The Imposition of Sanctions

Why are sanctions a popular tool for economic statecraft? How has the use of sanctions evolved over the past decades? In which ways do targeted sanctions work differently than comprehensive embargoes?

Required readings

- Chan, S., & Drury, A. C. (2000). Sanctions as economic statecraft: an overview. In *Sanctions as Economic Statecraft: Theory and Practice* (pp. 1-16). New York: Palgrave.
- Cortright, D., & Lopez, G. A. (2000). Learning from the Sanctions Decade. *Global Dialogue*, 2(3), 11-24.
- Wallensteen, P. & Staibano, C. (2005). Introduction. In *International Sanctions: Between Words and War in the International System* (pp. xv – xvii). Oxon: Routledge.

Further readings

- Brzoska, M. (2003). From dumb to smart-recent reforms of UN sanctions. *Global Governance*, 9, 519.
- *Drezner, D. W. (2011). Sanctions Sometimes Smart: Targeted Sanctions in Theory and Practice. *International Studies Review*, 13(1), 96-108.
- Tostensen, A. & Bull, B. (2002). Are Smart Sanctions Feasible? *World Politics*, 54(3), 373-403.

Data

- Attia, H., & Grauvogel, J. (2023). International Sanctions Termination, 1990–2018: Introducing the IST Dataset. *Journal of Peace Research*, 60(4), 709-719.
- Morgan, T. C., Bapat, N., & Kobayashi, Y. (2014). Threat and imposition of economic sanctions 1945–2005: Updating the TIES dataset. *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, 31(5), 541-558.

Session 11 (11 December 2023): Unilateral Sanctions Imposition

Why and when do the EU and the US impose sanctions? Do they live up to their normative standards when doing so?

Required readings

- Attia, H. (2023). Divert when it does not hurt: The initiation of economic sanctions by US presidents from 1989 to 2015. *Review of International Economics*, 1-23.
- Brummer, K. (2009). Imposing Sanctions: The Not So ‘Normative’ Power Europe. *European Foreign Affairs Review*, 14(2), 191-207.

Further readings

- Portela, C. (2012). *European Union sanctions and foreign policy: When and why do they work?* Routledge.
- Tama, J. (2020). Forcing the president's hand: How the US congress shapes foreign policy through sanctions legislation. *Foreign Policy Analysis*, 16(3), 397-416.
- Von Soest, C., & Wahman, M. (2015). Not all dictators are equal: Coups, fraudulent elections, and the selective targeting of democratic sanctions. *Journal of Peace Research*, 52(1), 17-31.
- Whang, T. (2011). Playing the Home Crowd? The Symbolic Use of Economic Sanctions in the United States. *International Studies Quarterly*, 55(3), 787-801.

Potential case study

China:

- Giumelli, F. (2016). The EU and China: Pleasing Actors at Home and Abroad. In *The Success of Sanctions: Lessons Learned from the EU Experience* (pp. 153-175). London: Routledge.
- Li, Y., & Drury, A. C. (2004). Threatening Sanctions When Engagement Would Be More Effective: Attaining Better Human Rights in China. *International Studies Perspectives*, 5(4), 378-394.
- Portela, C. (2015). Member States Resistance to EU Foreign Policy Sanctions. *European Foreign Affairs Review*, 20(2), 39-61. (until p. 47 is most relevant for the case study).

Malaysia:

- Attia, H., & Grauvogel, J. (2023). Monitoring the monitor? Selective responses to human rights transgressions. *International Studies Quarterly*, 67(2).
- Harmon, R., Arnon, D., & Park, B. (2022). TIP for tat: Political bias in human trafficking reporting. *British Journal of Political Science*, 52(1), 445-455.

Session 12 (18 December 2023): Multilateral Sanctions Imposition

What are the factors guiding the imposition of regional and UN sanctions? Do UN and regional sanctions complement or contradict each other?

Required readings

- Charron, A. & Portela, C. (2015). The UN, Regional Sanctions and Africa. *International Affairs*, 91(6), 1369-1385.
- Hellquist, E. and Palestini, S. (2020). Regional Sanctions and the Struggle for Democracy: Introduction to the Special Issue. *International Political Science Review*, OnlineFirst, 1-14.

Data

- Attia, H., & Grauvogel, J. (2023). International Sanctions Termination, 1990–2018: Introducing the IST Dataset. *Journal of Peace Research*, 60(4), 709-719.
- Biersteker, T. J., Eckert, S. E., Tourinho, M., & Hudáková, Z. (2018). UN targeted sanctions datasets (1991–2013). *Journal of Peace Research*, 55(3), 404-412.

Potential case study

Madagascar:

- Witt, A. (2017). Mandate Impossible: Mediation and the Return to Constitutional Order in Madagascar (2009-2013). *African Security*, 10(3), 205-222.
- Witt, A. (2020). Undoing Coups. *The African Union and Post-coup Intervention in Madagascar*. London: Zed Books (Chapter 4).

Winter break — No Class!

Session 13 (8 January 2024): The Effectiveness of Economic Sanctions

Does economic pain translate to political gain? How is sanctions effectiveness conceptualized and assessed in the literature? Are sanctions effective?

Required readings

- Early, B. R. (2011). Unmasking the black knights: Sanctions busters and their effects on the success of economic sanctions. *Foreign Policy Analysis*, 7(4), 381-402.
- Pape, R. A. (1997). Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work. *International Security*, 22(2), 90-136.

Further readings

- Elliott, K. A. (1998). The Sanctions Glass: Half Full or Completely Empty? *International Security*, 23(1), 50-65.
- Miers, A., & Morgan, T. (2002). Multilateral sanctions and foreign policy success: Can too many cooks spoil the broth? *International Interactions*, 28(2), 117-136.
- *Peksen, D. (2019). When Do Imposed Economic Sanctions Work? A Critical Review of the Sanctions Effectiveness Literature. *Defence and Peace Economics*, 30(6), 635-647.
- Walentek, D., Broere, J., Cinelli, M., Dekker, M. M., & Haslbeck, J. M. (2021). Success of Economic Sanctions Threats: Coercion, Information and Commitment. *International Interactions*, OnlineFirst, 1-32.
- Weber, P. M., & Schneider, G. (2020). How many hands to make sanctions work? Comparing EU and US sanctioning efforts. *European Economic Review*, 130, 103595.

Session 14 (15 January 2024): Presentation of Research Ideas for Term Papers

Session 15 (22 January 2024): Humanitarian consequences

How do sanctions harm the target country and the most vulnerable? Are they a reasonable policy choice in the view of these humanitarian consequences? Are smart sanctions feasible?

Required readings

- Allen, S. H. & Lektzian, D. (2013). Economic Sanctions: A Blunt Instrument? *Journal of Peace Research*, 50(1), 1221-1135.
- Weiss, T. G. (1999). Sanctions as a Foreign Policy Tool: Weighing Humanitarian Impulses. *Journal of Peace Research*, 36(5), 499-509.
- Watch: <https://www.youtube.com/shorts/1T5JRVR53Eo>.

Further readings

- Afesorghor, S. K., & Mahadevan, R. (2016). The Impact of Economic Sanctions on Income Inequality of Target States. *World Development*, 83, 1–11.
- *Drury, A. C., & Peksen, D. (2014). Women and Economic Statecraft: The Negative Impact International Economic Sanctions Visit on Women. *European Journal of International Relations*, 20(2), 463-490.
- Neuenkirch, M., & Neumeier, F. (2021). Sanctioned to Death? The Impact of Economic Sanctions on Life Expectancy and its Gender Gap. *The Journal of Development Studies*, 57(1), 139-162.

Potential case study

Iraq:

- Al-Ali, N. (2005). Reconstructing Gender: Iraqi Women Between Dictatorship, War, Sanctions and Occupation. *Third World Quarterly*, 26(4-5), 739-758.
- Buck, L., Gallant, N., & Nossal, K. R. (1998). Sanctions as a Gendered Instrument of Statecraft: The Case of Iraq. *Review of International Studies*, 24(1), 69-84.

Iran:

- Takeyh, R. & Maloney, S. (2011). The Self-Limiting Success of Iran Sanctions. *International Affairs*, 87(6), 1297-1312.
- Torbat, A. E. (2005). The Impact of US Trade and Financial Sanctions on Iran. *The World Economy*, 28(3), 407-434.

Session 16 (29 January 2024): Target Repercussions

Do sanctions unintentionally stabilize authoritarian regimes? Do sanctions destabilize targeted regimes? What are the transmission mechanisms from economic pressure to political consequences?

Required readings

- Galtung, J. (1967). On the Effects of International Economic Sanctions, With Examples from the Case of Rhodesia. *World Politics*, 19(3), 378-416.
- Grauvogel, J., Licht, A. A., & von Soest, C. (2017). Sanctions and Signals: How International Sanction Threats Trigger Domestic Protest in Targeted Regimes. *International Studies Quarterly*, 61(1), 86-97.

Further readings

- *Allen, S. H. (2008). The Domestic Political Costs of Economic Sanctions. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 52(6), 916-944.
- Grauvogel, J. & von Soest, C. (2014). Claims to Legitimacy Count: Why Sanctions Fail to Instigate Democratisation in Authoritarian Regimes. *European Journal of Political Research*, 53(4), 635-653.
- Peksen, D. & Drury, A. C. (2010). Coercive or Corrosive: The Negative Impact of Economic Sanctions on Democracy. *International Interactions*, 36(3), 240-264.

Potential case study

Russia:

- Alexseev, M. A. & Hale, H. E. (2020). Crimea Come What May: Do economic sanctions backfire politically? *Journal of Peace Research*, 57(2), 344-359.
- Frye, Timothy. (2019). Economic Sanctions and Public Opinion: Survey Experiments from Russia. *Comparative Political Studies*, 52(7), 967-994.

Zimbabwe:

- Eriksson, M. (2016). Episodes of EU Targeted Sanctions Against the Zimbabwe Leadership. In *Targeting Peace: Understanding UN and EU Targeted Sanctions* (pp. 193-232), London: Routledge.
- Grauvogel, J. (2017). The Impact of Sanctions on Opposition Movements in Zimbabwe (2001-2013). In *The 'Internal Opposition' Effect of International Sanctions: Insights from Burundi, Zimbabwe and a Qualitative Comparative Analysis of Sub-Saharan Africa* (pp. 191-243). Doctoral dissertation. Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Hamburg Carl von Ossietzky.