



International Sanctions: Actors, Processes and Consequences

General Information

Advanced BA seminar ("Vertiefungsseminar")

Summer term 2019

Thursday, 16:15-17:45

Location: AP 1 building, room 245

Material

The required readings and other materials can be accessed via STiNE

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Office hours: After the seminar or by appointment

Description of the Seminar & Objectives

Sanctions are one of the most popular foreign policy instruments for addressing violent conflicts, electoral misconduct, human rights abuses, and authoritarian rule. Altogether, the key sanctions senders – namely, the European Union (EU), the United Nations (UN), the United States (US) and regional organizations such as the African Union – have imposed well above 150 sanctions cases since the 1990s. In addition to 'traditional' embargos that target the whole country, sanctions senders have increasingly implemented so-called smart sanctions, including asset freezes and travel restrictions that target individuals. Research has initially focused on the question of whether sanctions work. Prominent 'success' cases such as the measures against Apartheid South Africa and spectacular 'failures' like the embargo against Iraq with its disastrous humanitarian consequences have offered a mixed picture. Evidence based on global datasets is similarly inconclusive. More recent scholarship has moved beyond the issue of effectiveness to uncover the micro-foundation of why sanctions (fail to) achieve the stated goals. In that vein, studies have inter alia addressed sanctions effects on democracy, regime stability, human rights and the economy of both sending and receiving states. The seminar seeks to offer students a nuanced understanding of one of the most widely used foreign policy tools in the 21st century by exploring its intended and unintended consequences. In doing so, we will examine famous and less-known cases and cross-national trends on the basis of key studies, policy works and our own empirical research.

At the end of the seminar, students are able to:

- Sketch trends in sanctions design and implementation that have emerged over the past decades
- Describe the most important sanctions senders and their specific imposition procedures
- Compare and contrast crucial sanctions cases
- Assess the strengths and weaknesses of key cross-national datasets on international sanctions
- Analyze important conditions for the success or failure of sanctions as well as the (un-) intended consequences of sanctions for issues such as democracy, human rights and economic development
- Discuss complex empirical and theoretical questions of sanctions research in oral presentations
- Provide and receive constructive criticism

Requirements

- **Regular attendance** is required to receive the ECTS. If students miss more than two sessions for reasons other than illness (attested via a sick certificate) or mandatory excursions, they have to summarize the required reading of the respective session (2 pages).
- **Preparation of the sessions and active participation:** Each student should read the mandatory readings before each session. This will allow you to actively readings' main argument (3 sentences or bullets are sufficient). The guiding questions for the respective sessions will help you.
- **Group presentations:** The presentations should not exceed 20 minutes. You are required to discuss your presentation no later than one week prior to the respective session on the basis of an extended outline and/or a preliminary version of the (Power Point) presentation –either after the seminar or via email. The group presentations should not summarize the mandatory reading, but critically discuss it and – starting from session 8 onwards – relate it to a salient case. The list of further literature offers a first hint, but you should also look for additional literature and material yourselves. Further guidelines will be provided in one of the first sessions.
- **Graded assignments (“benotete Prüfungsleistungen”):**
For 6 ECTS: A term paper (12-15 pages) has to be submitted by 30 September 2019 via email to the lecturers. The alternative are three take home essays (4-5 pages), in which you critically discuss and contextualize the mandatory readings (also taking into account the further literature). You will benefit from the classroom discussion when writing your take home essays. They have to be submitted at the beginning of the next session. Grading criteria will be distributed.
For 8 ECTS: In addition to the term paper or the three take home essays, you also have to hand in a book review (3 pages) by 30 September 2019; a list of potential books will be provided.

General Literature

Biersteker, T. J., Eckert, S. E., & Tourinho, M. (eds). (2016). *Targeted Sanctions: The Impact and Effectiveness of United Nations Action*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Drezner, D. W. (Ed.). (1999). *The Sanctions Paradox: Economic Statecraft and International Relations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Giumelli F. (2011). *Coercing, Constraining and Signalling: Explaining UN and EU Sanctions after the Cold War*. Essex: ECPR Press.

Hufbauer G.C., Schott, J.J., Elliott, K.A., & Oegg, B. (2007). *Economic Sanctions Reconsidered*. Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics.

Overview

Session	Date	Topic
1	4 April 2019	Introduction: Between words and wars (Hana Attia & Julia Grauvogel)
2	11 April 2019	From comprehensive embargos to targeted sanctions (Hana Attia)
3	18 April 2019	Assessing the effectiveness of sanctions (Julia Grauvogel)
4	25 April 2019	Qualitative and quantitative approaches to studying sanctions (Julia Grauvogel)

5	2 May 2019	'Unilateral' sanctions: US and EU measures (Hana Attia)
6	9 May 2019	Regional senders as new kinds of actors (Julia Grauvogel)
7	16 May 2019	United Nations and the importance of multilateralism (Hana Attia)
8	23 May 2019	The economic and financial effects of sanctions (Julia Grauvogel)
	30 May 2019	No session due to public holiday
9	6 June 2019	Sanctions busting: The role of black knights (Hana Attia)
	13 June 2019	No session
10	20 June 2019	Unintended humanitarian consequences (Julia Grauvogel)
11	27 June 2019	Target repercussions I: The decline of democracy (Hana Attia)
12	4 July 2019	Target repercussions II: Protest and regime destabilization (Julia Grauvogel)
13	11 July 2019	Concluding session: The termination of sanctions (Hana Attia)

Seminar Plan

Session 1 (4 April 2019): Introduction: Between words and wars

What is special about sanctions as a foreign policy tool? How have sanctions policy and sanctions research evolved over the past decades?

Introductory literature:

Wallensteen, P. & Staibano, C. (eds). (2005). *International Sanctions: Between Words and War in the International System*, Oxon: Routledge. (Introduction)

Cortright, D., & Lopez, G. A. (2000). Learning from the Sanctions Decade. *Global Dialogue*, 2(3), 11-24.

Session 2 (11 April 2019): From comprehensive embargoes to targeted sanctions

What explains the shift from comprehensive embargoes towards targeted measures in international sanctions policies? In which ways do targeted sanctions work differently?

Mandatory readings:

Drezner, D.W. (2011). Sanctions Sometimes Smart: Targeted Sanctions in Theory and Practice. *International Studies Review*, 13(1), 96-108.

Further literature:

Biersteker, T.J., Eckert, S.E., & Tourinho, M. (eds). (2016). *Targeted Sanctions: The Impacts and Effectiveness of United Nations Action* (pp. 11-28). New York: Cambridge University Press. (Chapter One: Thinking about United Nations Targeted Sanctions)

Brzoska, M. (2003). From Dumb to Smart: Recent Reforms of UN Sanctions. *Global Governance*, 9(4), 519-534.

Cortright, D. & Lopez, G.A. (eds). (2002). *Smart Sanctions: Targeting Economic Statecraft* (pp. 1-22). New York: Rowman & Littlefield. (Introduction: Assessing Smart Sanctions: Lessons from the 1990s)

Tostensen, A. & Bull, B. (2002). Are Smart Sanctions Feasible? *World Politics*, 54(3), 373-403.

Session 3 (18 April 2019): Assessing the effectiveness of sanctions

How do different scholars assess the success of economic sanctions? How do they conceptualize sanctions effectiveness?

Mandatory readings:

Pape, R.A. (1997). Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work. *International Security*, 22(2), 90-136. (Group A)

Giumelli F. (2011). *Coercing, Constraining and Signalling: Explaining UN and EU Sanctions after the Cold War* (pp. 29-50). Essex: ECPR Press. (Chapter Three: A Systematic Approach to Sanctions) (Group B)

Further literature:

Elliott, K.A. (1998). The Sanctions Glass: Half Full or Completely Empty? *International Security*, 23(1), 50-65.

Pape, R.A. (1998). Why Economic Sanctions *Still* Do Not Work. *International Security* 23(1), 66-77.

Session 4 (25 April 2019): Qualitative and quantitative approaches to studying sanctions

Which qualitative and quantitative approaches to the study of sanctions exist? What distinguishes the most common datasets?

Mandatory readings:

Jones, L. (2015). *Societies under Siege: Exploring how International Sanctions (Do Not) Work* (pp. 47-51). Oxford: Oxford University Press. (Sub-chapter on 'Methodology'). (All)

Biersteker, T.J., Eckert, S.E., Tourinho, M., & Hudáková, Z. (2018). UN Targeted Sanctions Datasets (1991-2013). *Journal of Peace Research*, 55(3), 404-412. (Group A)

Hufbauer G.C., Schott, J.J., Elliott, K.A., & Oegg, B. (2007): *Economic Sanctions Reconsidered* (pp. 1-19). Washington DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics (Chapter One: Introduction). (Group B)

Morgan, T.C, Bapat, N., & Krustev, V. (2009). The Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions, 1971-2000. *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, 26(1), 92-110. (Group C)

Further literature:

Morgan, T.C., Bapat, N., & Kobayashi, Y. (2014). Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions 1945-2005: Updating the TIES Dataset. *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, 31(5), 541-558.

Elliott, K.A. (2010). Assessing UN Sanctions after the Cold War: New and Evolving Standards of Measurement. *International Journal: Canada's Journal of Global Policy Analysis*, 65(1), 85-97.

Session 5 (2 May 2019): 'Unilateral' sanctions: US and EU measures

Why do the European Union and the United States impose sanctions? What are similarities and/or differences between these two senders?

Mandatory readings:

Brummer, K. (2009). Imposing Sanctions: The Not So 'Normative' Power Europe. *European Foreign Affairs Review*, 14(2), 191-207. (Group A)

Whang, T. (2011). Playing the Home Crowd? The Symbolic Use of Economic Sanctions in the United States. *International Studies Quarterly*, 55(3), 787-801. (Group B)

Further literature:

Drury, A.C. (2001). Sanctions as Coercive Diplomacy: The US President's Decision to Initiate Economic Sanctions. *Political Research Quarterly*, 54(3), 485-508.

Guimelli, F. (2016). *The Success of Sanctions: Lessons Learned from the EU Experience* (pp. 175-192), London: Routledge. (Chapter Ten: Conclusions: Sanctions as an Effective Foreign Policy Tool)

Hufbauer, G.C. & Schott, J.J. (1985). Economic Sanctions and US Foreign Policy. *PS: Political Science & Politics*, 18(4), 727-735.

Portela, C. (2012). *European Union Sanctions and Foreign Policy: When and Why Do They Work?* (pp. 19-34). London: Routledge. (Chapter 2: EU Sanctions: Evolution, Legal Framework and Policy)

Session 6 (9 May 2019): Regional senders as new kinds of actors

What are the procedures guiding the imposition of EU restrictive measures? Does the EU live up to its normative standards when imposing sanctions?

Mandatory reading:

Hellquist, E. (2014). Regional Organizations and Sanctions against Members: Explaining the Different Trajectories of the African Union, the League of Arab States, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. Berlin: KFG Working Paper Series.

Further literature:

Charron, A. & Portela, C. (2015). The UN, Regional Sanctions and Africa. *International Affairs*, 91(6), 1369-1385.

Witt, A. (2012). Negotiating Political Order(s): The Politics of Unconstitutional Changes of Government. Leipzig: Center for Area Studies Working Paper No. 2.

Hellquist, E. (2015). Interpreting Sanctions in Africa and Southeast Asia. *International Relations*, 29(3), 319-333.

Grauvogel, J., Newberry, K., & von Soest, C. (2013). Stabilität durch regionale Sanktionen in Afrika? Hamburg: GIGA Focus Africa.

Session 7 (16 May 2019): United Nations and the importance of multilateralism

What makes the UN special as a sanctions sender? What are the distinctive qualities of UN sanctions?

Mandatory reading:

Brzoska, M. & Lopez, G.A. (2016). Security Council Dynamics and Sanctions Design. In Biersteker, T.J., Eckert, S.E., & Tourinho, M. (eds), *Targeted Sanctions: The Impacts and Effectiveness of United Nations Action* (pp. 60-78). Cambridge University Press. (Chapter Three)

Further literature:

Charron, A. (2011). *UN Sanctions and Conflict: Responding to Peace and Security Threats*. London: Routledge. (Chapter One: Setting the Context)

Drezner, D.W. (2000). Bargaining, Enforcement, and Multilateral Sanctions: When Is Cooperation Counterproductive? *International Organization*, 54(1), 73-102.

Kaempfer, W.H. & Lowenberg, A.D. (1999). Unilateral versus Multilateral International Sanctions: A Public Choice Perspective. *International Studies Quarterly*, 43(1), 37-58.

Miers, A. & Morgan, C.T. (2002). Multilateral Sanctions and Foreign Policy Success: Can Too Many Cooks Spoil the Broth? *International Interactions*, 28(2), 117-136.

Session 8 (23 May 2019): The economic and financial effect of sanctions

How do sanctions affect economic ties and flows? How do they harm the target financially?

Mandatory reading:

Neuenkirchen, M. & Neumeier, F. (2016). The Impact of US Sanctions on Poverty. *Journal of Development Economics*, 121, 110-119.

Further literature:

Biglaiser, G. & Lektzian, D. (2011). The Effect of Sanctions on US Foreign Direct Investment. *International Organization*, 65(3), 531-551.

Potential case study – Iran: Torbat, A.E. (2005). The Impact of US Trade and Financial Sanctions on Iran. *The World Economy*, 28(3), 407-434.

Takeyh, R. & Maloney, S. (2011). The Self-Limiting Success of Iran Sanctions. *International Affairs*, 87(6), 1297-1312.

Session 9 (6 June 2019): Sanctions busting: The role of black knights

What role do third actors play? How can they affect/disrupt sanctions?

Mandatory reading:

Early, B.R. (2011). Unmasking the Black Knights: Sanctions Busters and Their Effects on the Success of Economic Sanctions. *Foreign Policy Analysis*, 7(4), 381-402.

Further literature:

Early, B.R. (2009). Sleeping with Your Friends' Enemies: An Explanation of Sanctions-Busting Trade. *International Studies Quarterly*, 53(1), 49-71.

McLean, E.V. & Whang, T. (2010). Friends or Foes? Major Trading Partners and the Success of Economic Sanctions. *International Studies Quarterly*, 54(2), 427-447.

Potential case study – Cuba: Early, B.R. (2015). *Busted Sanctions: Explaining Why Economic Sanctions Fail* (pp. 159-206). Stanford University Press. (Chapter Seven: Sanctions Busting for Politics: Analyzing Cuba's Aid-Based Sanctions Busters)

Session 10 (20 June 2019): Unintended humanitarian consequences

How do sanctions affect the most vulnerable? Are they a reasonable policy choice in the view of these humanitarian and human rights consequences?

Mandatory reading:

Weiss, T.G. (1999). Sanctions as a Foreign Policy Tool: Weighing Humanitarian Impulses. *Journal of Peace Research*, 36(5), 499-509.

Further literature:

Allen, S.H. & Lektzian, D. (2013). Economic Sanctions: A Blunt Instrument? *Journal of Peace Research*, 50(1), 1221-1135.

Peksen, D. (2009). Better or Worse? The Effect of Economic Sanctions on Human Rights. *Journal of Peace Research*, 46(1), 59-77.

Potential case study – Iraq: Hoskins, E. (1997). The Humanitarian Impacts of Economic Sanctions and War in Iraq. In T.G. Weiss, D. Cortright, G.A. Lopez, & L. Minear (eds), *Political Gain and Civilian Pain: Humanitarian Impacts of Economic Sanctions* (pp. 92-148). Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield.

Session 11 (27 June 2019): Target repercussions I: The decline of democracy

Do sanctions contribute to advance democracy? What helps/prevents them from doing so?

Mandatory reading:

Grauvogel, J. & von Soest, C. (2014). Claims to Legitimacy Count: Why Sanctions Fail to Instigate Democratisation in Authoritarian Regimes. *European Journal of Political Research*, 53(4), 635-653.

Further literature:

Peksen, D. & Drury, A.C. (2010). Coercive or Corrosive: The Negative Impact of Economic Sanctions on Democracy. *International Interactions*, 36(3), 240-264.

Von Soest, C. & Wahman, M. (2015). Are Democratic Sanctions Really Counterproductive? *Democratization*, 22(6), 957-980.

Potential case study – Myanmar: Jones, L. (2015). *Societies under Siege: Exploring How International Economic Sanctions (Do Not) Work*. Oxford University Press (Chapter Three: Myanmar: Sanctioning Military Rule)

Session 12 (4 July 2019): Protest and regime destabilization

Do sanctions stabilize or destabilize the targeted regimes? What are the transmission mechanisms from economic pressure to political consequences?

Mandatory readings:

Allen, S. H. (2008). The Domestic Political Costs of Economic Sanctions. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 52(6), 916-944.

Further literature:

Marinov, N. (2005). Do Economic Sanctions Destabilize Country Leaders? *American Journal of Political Science*, 49(3), 564-576.

Grauvogel, J., Licht, A.A., & von Soest, C. (2017). Sanctions and Signals: How International Sanction Threats Trigger Domestic Protest in Targeted Regimes. *International Studies Quarterly*. 61(1), 86-97.

Potential case study - Zimbabwe: Eriksson, M. (2016). *Targeting Peace: Understanding UN and EU Targeted Sanctions* (pp. 193-232), London: Routledge. (Chapter Nine: Episodes of EU Targeted Sanctions against the Zimbabwe Leadership)

Session 13 (11 July 2019): The termination of sanctions

How and why do sanctions end?

Mandatory reading:

Grauvogel, J. & Attia, H. (2019). How Do International Sanctions End? Towards a Process-Oriented, Relational, and Signaling Perspective. Working Paper.

Further literature:

Bolks, S.M. & Al-Sowayel, D. (2000). How Long Do Economic Sanctions Last? Examining the Sanctioning Process through Duration. *Political Research Quarterly*, 53(2), 241-265.

Dorussen, H. & Mo, J. (2001). Ending Economic Sanctions Audience Costs and Rent-Seeking as Commitment Strategies. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 45(4), 395-426.

McGillivray, F. & Stam, A.C. (2004). Political Institutions, Coercive Diplomacy, and the Duration of Economic Sanctions. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 48(2), 154-72.

Potential case studies – Zimbabwe or Iran: see mandatory readings.