



Sanctions in International Relations

General Information

BA seminar ("Lektürkurs")

Summer term 2021 | Tuesday, 16:15-17:45

Location: Digital via Zoom

Material

The required readings and other materials can be accessed via STiNE

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Description of the Seminar & Objectives

Sanctions are one of the most popular foreign policy instruments for addressing violent conflicts, electoral misconduct, human rights abuses, and authoritarian rule. The most important sanctions senders – namely, the European Union (EU), the United Nations (UN), the United States (US) and regional organizations such as the African Union (AU) – impose a variety of measures to achieve different goals ranging from democratization to peace and (cyber) security. In addition to 'traditional' embargos that target the whole country, sanctions senders have increasingly implemented so-called smart sanctions including asset freezes and travel restrictions that target individuals. Research has initially focused on the question of whether sanctions work. Prominent 'success' cases such as the measures against Apartheid South Africa and spectacular 'failures' like the embargo against Iraq with its disastrous humanitarian consequences have offered a mixed picture. Evidence based on global datasets is similarly inconclusive. More recently, scholars have moved beyond the issue of effectiveness to uncover the micro-foundation of why sanctions (fail to) achieve the stated goals. Studies have inter alia addressed sanctions effects on democracy, human rights, (armed) conflict, public health, and the economy of both sending and receiving actors. This course seeks to offer students a nuanced understanding of one of the most widely used foreign policy tools in the 21st century by exploring their imposition, intended and unintended consequences, termination, as well as their relation to other foreign policy tools such as military interventions or diplomacy. In doing so, we will examine famous and less-known cases as well as cross-national trends based on key studies, policy works and our own empirical research.

At the end of the seminar, students are able to:

- Discuss up-to-date empirical and theoretical questions of sanctions research
- Sketch trends in sanctions design and implementation that have emerged over the past decades
- Describe the most important sanctions senders and their specific procedure for imposing sanctions
- Compare and contrast crucial sanctions cases as well as the strengths and weaknesses of key cross-national datasets on international sanctions
- Identify important conditions for the success or failure of sanctions and analyze the (un-)intended consequences of sanctions for issues such as democracy, human rights, public health, and economic development
- Provide and receive constructive criticism

Requirements

- **Regular attendance** is required to receive the ECTS. If students miss sessions due to illness or pandemic-related reasons, the comprehensive documentation of the virtual classroom discussions via protocols will ensure that students can recapitulate the respective sessions. If students miss more than two sessions for reasons other than illness (attested via a sick note) or pandemic related reasons, they have to summarize the required readings of the respective session (2 pages).
- **Preparation of the sessions and active participation:** Each student should prepare the mandatory readings before each session. We encourage you to write down three (brief) thoughts that reflect the readings' main arguments. The guiding questions for the respective sessions will help you.
- **Group presentations OR individual protocol:** Each student is required to hold a group presentation or to write an individual protocol. The presentations should not exceed 15 minutes. The group presentation will introduce one empirical case and discuss it in light of the conceptual/theoretical focus of the respective session. The list of further literature offers a first hint regarding potential readings for the case study, but you should also look for additional literature and material yourselves. Alternatively, students can individually write the minutes of one seminar session ("Protokoll") and reflect upon the classroom discussions with reference to the further literature and the case presented. Further guidelines will be provided in one of the first sessions.
- **Graded assignments ("benotete Prüfungsleistungen"):**
For 6 ECTS: Two essays ("Textanalysen") each 6 pages have to be submitted by September 30, 2021 via email to the lecturers. Submissions are open starting from June 1, 2021. Grading criteria will be distributed.

General Literature

Biersteker, T., Tourinho, M., & Eckert, S. (2016). Thinking about United Nations targeted sanctions. In T. Biersteker, S. Eckert, & M. Tourinho (Eds.). *Targeted Sanctions: The Impacts and Effectiveness of United Nations Action* (pp. 11-37). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Early, B. J. & Cilizoglu, M. (2020), Economic Sanctions in Flux: Enduring Challenges, New Policies, and Defining the Future Research Agenda. *International Studies Perspectives*, 21(4), 438–477.

Grauvogel, J. and Attia, H. (2019). Wie enden internationale Sanktionen? Zur Bedeutung von Prozessen, Beziehungen und Signalen. *Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen*, 26(2), 5–33.

Hellquist, E. & Palestini, S. 2020. Regional Sanctions and the Struggle for Democracy: Introduction to the Special Issue. *International Political Science Review*, OnlineFirst. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0192512120968109>.

Weber, P. M. & Schneider, G. 2020. Post-Cold War Sanctioning by the EU, the UN, and the US: Introducing the EUSANCT Dataset. *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, OnlineFirst. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0738894220948729>.

Overview

Session	Date	Topic
1	6 April 2021	Introduction: Between words and wars (Hana Attia & Julia Grauvogel)
2	13 April 2021	Foreign policy tools in international relations (Hana Attia)
3	20 April 2021	From comprehensive to targeted sanctions (Julia Grauvogel)
4	27 April 2021	Qualitative and quantitative approaches to studying sanctions (Hana Attia)
5	4 May 2021	Effectiveness of economic sanctions (Julia Grauvogel)
6	11 May 2021	'Unilateral' sanctions: US and EU measures (Hana Attia)
7	18 May 2021	'Multilateral' sanctions: Regional senders and the UN (Julia Grauvogel)
8	25 May 2021	Humanitarian consequences I: Economic and financial effects (Hana Attia)
9	1 June 2021	Humanitarian consequences II: Sanctions and gender (Julia Grauvogel)
10	8 June 2021	Target repercussions I: Regime stabilization and rally-round-the-flag effect (Hana Attia)
11	15 June 2021	Target repercussions II: Protest and regime destabilization (Julia Grauvogel)
12	22 June 2021	Sanctions busting: The role of black knights (Hana Attia)
13	29 June 2021	The termination of sanctions (Julia Grauvogel)
14	6 July 2021	Foreign policy substitution and complementation (Hana Attia & Julia Grauvogel)

Seminar Plan

Session 1 (6 April 2021): Introduction: Between words and wars

What is special about sanctions as a foreign policy tool? How has the use of sanctions evolved over the past decades?

Introductory literature:

Cortright, D., & Lopez, G. A. (2000). Learning from the Sanctions Decade. *Global Dialogue*, 2(3), 11-24.

Wallensteen, P. & Staibano, C. (2005). Introduction. In *International Sanctions: Between Words and War in the International System* (pp. xv – xvii). Oxon: Routledge.

Session 2 (13 April 2021): Foreign policy tools in international relations

What tools are available to pursue foreign policy objectives? What are their strengths and weaknesses?

Mandatory readings:

Group A: Apodaca, C. (2017). Foreign Aid as Foreign Policy Tool. *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics*, 1-20.

Group B: Nagel, R. U., & Govinda C. (2017). Mediation and Foreign Policy. *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics*, 1-23.

Group C: Sullivan, P. L., & Koch, M. T. (2009). Military Intervention by Powerful States, 1945—2003. *Journal of Peace Research*, 46(5), 707-718.

Further literature:

Baldwin, D. A. (2000). Success and Failure in Foreign Policy. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 3(1), 167-182.

Bentall, P. (2016). United Nations Targeted Sanctions and Other Policy Tools: Diplomacy, Legal, Use of Force. In T. Biersteker, S. Eckert, & M. Tourinho (Eds.). *Targeted Sanctions: The Impacts and Effectiveness of United Nations Action* (pp. 79-100). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Session 3 (20 April 2021): From comprehensive to targeted sanctions

How has the imposition of sanctions evolved over the years? In which ways do targeted sanctions work differently than comprehensive embargoes?

Mandatory readings:

Group A: Drezner, D. W. (2011). Sanctions Sometimes Smart: Targeted Sanctions in Theory and Practice. *International Studies Review*, 13(1), 96-108.

Group B: Tostensen, A. & Bull, B. (2002). Are Smart Sanctions Feasible? *World Politics*, 54(3), 373-403.

Further literature:

Biersteker, T., Tourinho, M., & Eckert, S. (2016). Thinking about United Nations Targeted Sanctions. In T. Biersteker, S. Eckert, & M. Tourinho (Eds.). *Targeted Sanctions: The Impacts and Effectiveness of United Nations Action* (pp. 11-37). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Brzoska, M. (2003). From Dumb to Smart: Recent Reforms of UN Sanctions. *Global Governance*, 9(4), 519-534.

Cortright, D. & Lopez, G. A. (2002). Introduction: Assessing Smart Sanctions: Lessons from the 1990s. In D. Cortright, & G. A. Lopez (Eds.). *Smart Sanctions: Targeting Economic Statecraft* (pp. 1-22). New York: Rowman & Littlefield.

Session 4 (27 April 2021): Qualitative and quantitative approaches to studying sanctions

Which qualitative and quantitative approaches to the study of sanctions exist? What distinguishes the most common datasets?

Mandatory readings:

All: Jones, L. (2015). Sub-chapter on 'Methodology'. In *Societies under Siege: Exploring how International Sanctions (Do Not) Work* (pp. 47-51). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Group A: Biersteker, T. J., Eckert, S. E., Tourinho, M., & Hudáková, Z. (2018). UN Targeted Sanctions Datasets (1991-2013). *Journal of Peace Research*, 55(3), 404-412.

Group B: Hufbauer G. C., Schott, J. J., Elliott, K. A., & Oegg, B. (2007). Introduction. In *Economic Sanctions Reconsidered* (pp. 1-19). Washington DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics.

Group C: Morgan, T. C., Bapat, N., & Krustev, V. (2009). The Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions, 1971-2000. *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, 26(1), 92-110.

Further literature:

Elliott, K. A. (2010). Assessing UN Sanctions after the Cold War: New and Evolving Standards of Measurement. *International Journal: Canada's Journal of Global Policy Analysis*, 65(1), 85-97.

Morgan, T. C., Bapat, N., & Kobayashi, Y. (2014). Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions 1945-2005: Updating the TIES Dataset. *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, 31(5), 541-558.

Weber, P. M., & Schneider, G. (2020). Post-Cold War Sanctioning by the EU, the UN, and the US: Introducing the EUSANCT Dataset. *Conflict Management and Peace Science*. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0738894220948729>.

Session 5 (4 May 2021): Effectiveness of economic sanctions: Economic pain, political gain?

How is sanctions effectiveness conceptualized and assessed in the literature?

Mandatory readings:

Group A: Giumelli, F. (2016). Introduction: Measuring the Effectiveness of Sanctions. In *The Success of Sanctions: Lessons Learned from the EU Experience* (pp. 1-15). London: Routledge.

Group B: Pape, R. A. (1997). Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work. *International Security*, 22(2), 90-136.

Further literature:

Elliott, K. A. (1998). The Sanctions Glass: Half Full or Completely Empty? *International Security*, 23(1), 50-65.

Pape, R. A. (1998). Why Economic Sanctions *Still* Do Not Work. *International Security*, 23(1), 66-77.

Peksen, D. (2019). When Do Imposed Economic Sanctions Work? A Critical Review of the Sanctions Effectiveness Literature. *Defence and Peace Economics*, 30(6), 635-647.

Walentek, D., Broere, J., Cinelli, M., Dekker, M. M., & Haslbeck, J. M. (2021). Success of Economic Sanctions Threats: Coercion, Information and Commitment. *International Interactions*, OnlineFirst, 1-32.

Session 6 (11 May 2021): 'Unilateral' sanctions: US and EU measures

Why do the EU and the US impose sanctions? Do they live up to their normative standards when doing so?

Mandatory readings:

Group A: Brummer, K. (2009). Imposing Sanctions: The Not So 'Normative' Power Europe. *European Foreign Affairs Review*, 14(2), 191-207.

Group B: Whang, T. (2011). Playing the Home Crowd? The Symbolic Use of Economic Sanctions in the United States. *International Studies Quarterly*, 55(3), 787-801.

Further literature:

Drury, A. C. (2001). Sanctions as Coercive Diplomacy: The US President's Decision to Initiate Economic Sanctions. *Political Research Quarterly*, 54(3), 485-508.

Hufbauer, G. C. & Schott, J. J. (1985). Economic Sanctions and US Foreign Policy. *PS: Political Science & Politics*, 18(4), 727-735.

Portela, C. (2012). EU Sanctions: Evolution, Legal Framework and Policy. In *European Union Sanctions and Foreign Policy: When and Why Do They Work?* (pp. 19-34). London: Routledge.

Tama, J. (2020). Forcing the President's Hand: How the US Congress Shapes Foreign Policy through Sanctions Legislation. *Foreign Policy Analysis*, 16(3), 397-416.

Von Soest, C., & Wahman, M. (2015). Not All Dictators Are Equal: Coups, Fraudulent Elections, and the Selective Targeting of Democratic Sanctions. *Journal of Peace Research*, 52(1), 17-31.

Potential case study – China:

Giumelli, F. (2016). The EU and China: Pleasing Actors at Home and Abroad. In *The Success of Sanctions: Lessons Learned from the EU Experience* (pp. 153-175). London: Routledge.

Portela, C. (2015). Member States Resistance to EU Foreign Policy Sanctions. *European Foreign Affairs Review*, 20(2), 39-61. (until p. 47 is most relevant for the case study)

Li, Y., & Drury, A. C. (2004). Threatening Sanctions When Engagement Would Be More Effective: Attaining Better Human Rights in China. *International Studies Perspectives*, 5(4), 378-394.

Session 7 (18 May 2021): ‘Multilateral’ sanctions: Regional senders and the United Nations

What are the procedures guiding the imposition of regional and UN sanctions? Do UN and regional sanctions complement or contradict each other?

Mandatory reading:

Charron, A. & Portela, C. (2016) The Relationship Between United Nations Sanctions and Regional Sanctions Regimes. In Biersteker, T.J., Eckert, S. E., & Tourinho, M. (Eds.). *Targeted Sanctions: The Impacts and Effectiveness of United Nations Action* (pp. 101-118). Cambridge University Press.

Further literature:

Charron, A. & Portela, C. (2015). The UN, Regional Sanctions and Africa. *International Affairs*, 91(6), 1369-1385.

Charron, A. (2011). Setting the Context. In *UN Sanctions and Conflict: Responding to Peace and Security Threats* (pp. 1-16). London: Routledge.

Grauvogel, J., Newberry, K., & von Soest, C. (2013). Stabilität durch regionale Sanktionen in Afrika? Hamburg: GIGA Focus Africa.

Hellquist, E. and Palestini, S. (2020). Regional Sanctions and the Struggle for Democracy: Introduction to the Special Issue. *International Political Science Review*, OnlineFirst, 1-14. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0192512120968109>.

Potential case study – Madagascar:

Witt, A. (2017). Mandate Impossible: Mediation and the Return to Constitutional Order in Madagascar (2009-2013). *African Security*, 10(3), 205-222.

Witt, A. (2020). *Undoing Coups. The African Union and Post-coup Intervention in Madagascar*. London: Zed Books (Chapter 4).

Session 8 (25 May 2021): Humanitarian consequences I: Economic and financial effects of sanctions

How do sanctions harm the target country and the most vulnerable? Are they a reasonable policy choice in the view of these humanitarian consequences?

Mandatory reading:

Weiss, T. G. (1999). Sanctions as a Foreign Policy Tool: Weighing Humanitarian Impulses. *Journal of Peace Research*, 36(5), 499-509.

Further literature:

Allen, S. H. & Lektzian, D. (2013). Economic Sanctions: A Blunt Instrument? *Journal of Peace Research*, 50(1), 1221-1135.

Neuenkirchen, M. & Neumeier, F. (2016). The Impact of US Sanctions on Poverty. *Journal of Development Economics*, 121, 110-119.

Afesorgbor, S. K., & Mahadevan, R. (2016). The Impact of Economic Sanctions on Income Inequality of Target States. *World Development*, 83, 1–11.

Potential case study – Iran:

Salehi-Isfahani, D. (2020, September 23). Iran: The Double Jeopardy of Sanctions and COVID-19. *Brookings Institute OP-ED*. <https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/iran-the-double-jeopardy-of-sanctions-and-covid-19/> (accessed 22 March 2021).

Takeyh, R. & Maloney, S. (2011). The Self-Limiting Success of Iran Sanctions. *International Affairs*, 87(6), 1297-1312.

Torbat, A. E. (2005). The Impact of US Trade and Financial Sanctions on Iran. *The World Economy*, 28(3), 407-434.

Session 9 (1 June 2021): Humanitarian consequences II: Sanctions and gender effects

Do sanctions have varying effects on different societal groups? How and why do sanctions disadvantage women?

Mandatory reading:

Drury, A. C., & Peksen, D. (2014). Women and Economic Statecraft: The Negative Impact International Economic Sanctions Visit on Women. *European Journal of International Relations*, 20(2), 463-490.

Further literature:

Neuenkirch, M., & Neumeier, F. (2021). Sanctioned to Death? The Impact of Economic Sanctions on Life Expectancy and its Gender Gap. *The Journal of Development Studies*, 57(1), 139-162.

Potential case study – Iraq:

Al-Ali, N. (2005). Reconstructing Gender: Iraqi Women Between Dictatorship, War, Sanctions and Occupation. *Third World Quarterly*, 26(4-5), 739-758.

Al-Jawaheri Y. H. (2008). *Women in Iraq: The Gender Impact of International Sanctions*. London: I.B. Tauris.

Buck, L., Gallant, N., & Nossal, K. R. (1998). Sanctions as a Gendered Instrument of Statecraft: The Case of Iraq. *Review of International Studies*, 24(1), 69-84.

Session 10 (8 June 2021): Target repercussions I: Regime stabilization and rally-round-the-flag effect

Do sanctions unintentionally stabilize authoritarian regimes? Which mechanisms could explain this effect?

Mandatory reading:

Galtung, J. (1967). On the Effects of International Economic Sanctions, With Examples from the Case of Rhodesia. *World Politics*, 19(3), 378-416.

Further literature:

Grauvogel, J. & von Soest, C. (2014). Claims to Legitimacy Count: Why Sanctions Fail to Instigate Democratisation in Authoritarian Regimes. *European Journal of Political Research*, 53(4), 635-653.

Peksen, D. & Drury, A. C. (2010). Coercive or Corrosive: The Negative Impact of Economic Sanctions on Democracy. *International Interactions*, 36(3), 240-264.

Potential case study – Russia:

Alexseev, M. A. & Hale, H. E. (2020). Crimea Come What May: Do economic sanctions backfire politically? *Journal of Peace Research*, 57(2), 344-359.

Frye, Timothy. (2019). Economic Sanctions and Public Opinion: Survey Experiments from Russia. *Comparative Political Studies*, 52(7), 967-994.

Kazun, A. (2016). Framing Sanctions in the Russian Media: The Rally Effect and Putin's Enduring Popularity. *Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization*, 24(3), 327-350.

Session 11 (15 June 2021): Target repercussions II: Protest and regime destabilization

(How) do sanctions destabilize targeted regimes? What are the transmission mechanisms from economic pressure to political consequences?

Mandatory reading:

Allen, S. H. (2008). The Domestic Political Costs of Economic Sanctions. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 52(6), 916-944.

Further literature:

Grauvogel, J., Licht, A. A., & von Soest, C. (2017). Sanctions and Signals: How International Sanction Threats Trigger Domestic Protest in Targeted Regimes. *International Studies Quarterly*, 61(1), 86-97.

Potential case study – Zimbabwe:

Eriksson, M. (2016). Episodes of EU Targeted Sanctions Against the Zimbabwe Leadership. In *Targeting Peace: Understanding UN and EU Targeted Sanctions* (pp. 193-232), London: Routledge.

Grauvogel, J. (2017). The Impact of Sanctions on Opposition Movements in Zimbabwe (2001-2013). In *The 'Internal Opposition' Effect of International Sanctions: Insights from Burundi, Zimbabwe and a Qualitative Comparative Analysis of Sub-Saharan Africa* (pp. 191-243), Doctoral dissertation, Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Hamburg Carl von Ossietzky.

Session 12 (22 July 2021): Sanctions busting: The role of black knights

What role do third actors play? How can they affect and/or disrupt sanctions?

Mandatory reading:

Early, B. R. (2009). Sleeping with Your Friends' Enemies: An Explanation of Sanctions-Busting Trade. *International Studies Quarterly*, 53(1), 49-71.

Further literature:

Early, B. R. (2011). Unmasking the Black Knights: Sanctions Busters and Their Effects on the Success of Economic Sanctions. *Foreign Policy Analysis*, 7(4), 381-402.

McLean, E. V. & Whang, T. (2010). Friends or Foes? Major Trading Partners and the Success of Economic Sanctions. *International Studies Quarterly*, 54(2), 427-447.

Su, Y. H. (2021). Trade Plants the Flag: Sanctions-busting and the Signing of New Preferential Trade Agreements. *Foreign Policy Analysis*, 17(1), 67-85.

Weber, P. M. & Stępień B. (2020). Conform or Challenge? Adjustment Strategies of Sanction-torn Companies. *The World Economy*, 43(11), 3006-3024.

Potential case study – Cuba:

Early, B. R. (2015). Sanctions Busting for Politics: Analyzing Cuba's Aid-Based Sanctions Busters. In *Busted Sanctions: Explaining Why Economic Sanctions Fail* (pp. 159-206). Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Fisk, D. W. (2000). Economic sanctions: The Cuba Embargo Revisited. In C. Steve & A. C. Drury (Eds.). *Sanctions as Economic Statecraft* (pp. 65-85). London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Session 13 (29 June 2021): The termination of sanctions

How and why do sanctions end? Which considerations shape the termination process?

Mandatory reading:

Grauvogel, J. & Attia, H. (2019). *How Do International Sanctions End? Towards a Process-Oriented, Relational, and Signaling Perspective* (GIGA Working Paper No. 320). <https://www.giga-hamburg.de/de/publikationen/12904240-how-do-international-sanctions-end-towards-process-oriented-relational-signalling-perspective/> (accessed 23 March 2021).

Further literature:

Attia, H., Grauvogel, J., & von Soest, C. (2020). The Termination of International Sanctions: Explaining Target Compliance and Sender Capitulation, *European Economic Review*, 129.

Bolks, S. M. & Al-Sowayel, D. (2000). How Long Do Economic Sanctions Last? Examining the Sanctioning Process through Duration, *Political Research Quarterly*, 53(2), 241-265.

Dorussen, H. & Mo, J. (2001). Ending Economic Sanctions Audience Costs and Rent-Seeking as Commitment Strategies, *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 45(4), 395–426.

Krustev, V. L., & Morgan, T. C. (2011). Ending Economic Coercion: Domestic Politics and International Bargaining, *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, 28(4), 351-376.

McGillivray, F. & Stam, A. C. (2004). Political Institutions, Coercive Diplomacy, and the Duration of Economic Sanctions, *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 48(2), 154–72.

Potential case studies – Zimbabwe or Iran: see mandatory readings.

Session 14 (6 July 2021): Foreign policy substitution and complementation

Are sanctions substitute or complimentary tools of foreign policy? How do sanctions relate to the other foreign policy tools?

Mandatory reading:

Baldwin, D. A. (2000). The Sanctions Debate and the Logic of Choice. *International Security*, 24(3), 80-107.

Further literature:

Biersteker, T. J. & Brubaker, R. & Lanz, D. (2019). UN Sanctions and Mediation: Establishing Evidence to Inform Practice. *United Nations University Centre for Policy Research*, 18 February 2019.

Clark, D. H., & Reed, W. (2005). The Strategic Sources of Foreign Policy Substitution. *American Journal of Political Science*, 49(3), 609-624.

Lektzian, D., & Regan, P. M. (2016). Economic Sanctions, Military Interventions, and Civil Conflict Outcomes. *Journal of Peace Research*, 53(4), 554-568.